Appendix B: Additional Results
• Table A .1 reports the probit estimates for the probability that a PA voluntary adopted • Table A.2 complements Table 4 in the paper. It reports the DD estimates inclusive of PA-specific time varying controls obtained using control group 2 (Population), panels A and B in the table, and control group 3 (Experience and Population), panels C and D in the table.
• Table A.3 complements Table 5 in the paper. It reports the 95% confidence interval DD estimates obtained under three different methods for calculating standard errors:
clustering by PA-year, clustering by PA and Conley-Taber standard errors.
• Table A .4 reports the matching-DD estimates. These estimates represent a relevant robustness check for those reported in the paper because identification of the causal effect of the FPA switch is achieved not assuming random assignment of the treatment across PAs, but under the assumption that contracts of the treated and untreated PAs differ only along observable dimensions. The sample auctions are similar along various dimensions, but in the main analysis there is no explicit attempt to balance auctions along their observable characteristics. Implementing a matching strategy, however, cannot avoid considering the need to control for differences between PAs ii in their approximate mode winning discount. For example, if Turin post-treatment auctions were mostly similar to the auctions of a PA with a high modal winning discount and its pre-treatment auctions were mostly similar to the auctions of a PA with a low modal bid, an upward bias in the estimate of the FPAs coefficient would likely result under conventional matching strategies. My proposed solution follows Nicols (2007 Nicols ( , 2008 and consists of applying the DD estimator to a sample that is reweighted to balance treatment and control auctions.
37 Details about this procedure are given in the table note. Its main advantage is that it allows me to easily incorporate PA fixed effects, thus accounting for the modal winning bid differences. The results broadly confirm the findings in the paper regarding the presence of a trade-off between winning discounts and performance under the FPA.
• Table A .5 reports regression results that complement the descriptive statistics reported in Table 7 in the main text. The regression analysis is performed separately for two groups of PAs (those voluntarily switching to FPAs and those forced to switch) and for two dependent variables (the Winning Discount and the Days to Award ). The results in Table A .2 is that the result in the table above are obtained after reweighting the sample. The procedure can be described in three steps. First, I estimate the probability that an auction pertains to a treated PA as a function of observable characteristics (this is implemented through a probit model in which the set of regressors consists in Reserve Price, Fiscal Efficiency and dummy variables for Year and Work Type). Second, I use the estimated probability of treatment (propensity score), λ, to reweight the data giving a weight of 1 to treatment units and λ /1 − λ to control units. Third, I estimate the same DD models described earlier, but now including sample weights. Stata codes to implement this procedure are presented by Nicols (2007 Nicols ( , 2008 . -"RDD" regression discontinuity design with robust standard errors. The RDD is estimated parametrically through a regression model that controls for a third degree polynomial in Reserve Price. The discontinuity is the e1 million reserve price and the sample includes only auction with a reserve price between e500,000 and 1.5 million and held between November 2008 and April 2011. Because of the paucity of observations near the cutoff, these estimates should be interpreted with particular caution.
